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Notice of Supplemental Authority; 
University of Utah, KUED v. Paula McQuown 
Case No. 20692 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant in the 
above-referenced case, which is now under advisement, supplements Appellant's 
brief on the issue respecting the appropriate standard of review to be applied by 
the District Court by reference to Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington et aL 
U.S. (April 21, 1986, Docket No. 85-195), a copy of which is attached 
hereto as ExhibitTfA." Icicle Seafoods, Inc., citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 
U.S. (1985), holds that a reviewing court should give difference to the findings 
of the original finder of fact and should not make its own factual findings based 




Ms. Paula McQuown 
William T. Evans, Esq. 
NOTE Where it is feasible a s>ilabus fheadnote) will be released as is 
being done in connection with this case at the time the opinion is issued 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader See 
United States v Detroit Lumber Co 200 I S 321 337 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. v. WORTHINGTON ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
No. 85-195. Argued February 25, 1986—Decided April 21, 1986 
Respondents were employed by petitioner as members of the Engineering 
Department on board a barge. They sued petitioner in Federal District 
Court, seeking to recover overtime benefits under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act (FLSA). Finding that they were seamen because they per-
formed work of a maritime character on navigable waters, the District 
Court held that respondents were excluded from such benefits under tie 
provision of the FLSA that excludes "any employee employed as a sea-
man." The Court of Appeals reversed Reviewing under a "de novo" 
standard, the Court of Appeals found that respondents' "dominant em-
ployment" was "industrial maintenance" and that the "maritime work" 
that they performed took only a small portion of their time, and there-
fore concluded that respondents were not seamen 
Held The Court of Appeals erred in engaging in such factfinding. The 
facts necessary to a proper determination of the legal question whether 
an exemption to the FLSA applies in a particular case should be re-
viewed by the courts of appeals pursuant to the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of review set forth m Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 
like the facts m other civil bench-tried litigation in federal courts 
Waiting v General Industries Co , 330 U S 545 Here, if the Court of 
Appeals believed that the District Court s factual findings were "clearly 
erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 52(a) it could have set them 
aside, whereas, if it believed that the findings were unassailable, but 
that the proper rule of law was not correctly applied to those findings, it 
could have reversed the District Court's judgment on that ground. But 
it should not simply have made factual findings of its own Pp 3-6. 
749 F 2d 1409, vacated and remanded 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. r. WORTHINGTON 
Syllabus 
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, 
C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and 
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-195 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC., PETITIONER v. LARRY 
WORTHINGTON ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT Of 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[April 21, 1986] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondents sued their employer, petitioner Icicle Sea-
foods, Inc., to recover overtime benefits to which they 
thought they were entitled under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA), 29 U. S. C. § 207(a)(1). After a two-day trial 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington held that respondents wrere excluded from the 
overtime benefits of the FLSA by 29 U. S. C. § 213(b)(6), 
which excludes "any employee employed as a seaman/' Re-
viewing this issue under a "de novo" standard of review, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the judg-
ment of the District Court, holding that respondents wrere 
not "seamen," but instead were industrial maintenance em-
ployees on a barge that processed fish caught by a fishing 
fleet in the coastal waters of the Pacific Northwest. 749 F. 
2d 1409 (1984). We granted certiorari to consider whether 
the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate standard of re-
view in passing on the District Court's judgment. 474 U. S. 
(1985). 
The District Court made the following pertinent findings of 
fact related to whether respondents were "seamen" within 
the meaning of § 213(b)(6): 
"2. Defendant Icicle Seafoods owned and operated a 
seafood processing vessel named the ARCTIC STAR. 
Each of the Plaintiffs worked for Defendant on board the 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. v. WORTHINGTON 
ARCTIC STAR as members of the Engineering Depart-
ment . . . . The ARCTIC STAR is a nonself-propelled 
barge which is moved from place to place with the aid of 
a tow boat, and is located throughout the waters of 
Alaska or Washington, depending on the season and type 
of seafood being caught and processed. 
"7. None of the Plaintiffs were members of the Pro-
cessing Crew on board the ARCTIC STAR. The Pro-
cessing Crew performed all the hands-on processing or 
packing of the fish or shellfish. Plaintiffs were members 
of the Engineering Department on board the ARCTIC 
STAR, considered themselves very distinct from the 
Processing Crew, and did not perform any hands-on pro-
cessing or packing of fish or shellfish. As members of 
the Engineering Department, Plaintiffs were responsi-
ble for maintaining all systems for support and continu-
ous operation of the vessel while at moorage or under-
way. Although working in shifts, the Plaintiffs had to 
be available on call 24 hours a day to perform work at a 
moment's notice if necessary to keep the vessel operat-
ing. Even though the plaintiffs were not licensed by the 
Coast Guard as engineers or members of an engineering 
department, each of the Plaintiffs performed tasks which 
conformed to those expected of Coast Guard licensed 
personnel. The very description of the Plaintiff's work 
is that of a marine engineer or member of an engineering 
department. In summary, each of the Plaintiffs were 
members of the crew of the ARCTIC STAR and per-
formed woi k which was maritime in character and ren-
dered while the ARCTIC STAR was in navigable wa-
ters. Each of the Plaintiff's employment was that of a 
seaman." App. A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 2-3, 5-6. 
The Court of Appeals read the District Court's opinion as 
holding that respondents were "seamen" under § 213(b)(6) be-
cause the evidence showed that they "performed work of a 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. v. WORTHINGTON 
maritime character on navigable waters." 749 F. 2d, at 
1411. 
In reviewing this conclusion, the Court of Appeals initially 
pointed out that it and other courts of appeals have applied 
conflicting standards of review to claims of exclusion from the 
FLSA, and attributed these different approaches to three 
cases decided by this Court within a few months of each other 
during its October 1946 Term. Ibid. The Court of Appeals 
recognized that in Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 
U. S. 545 (1947), this Court held that whether an employee 
falls within the exclusion for "executives" under 29 U. S. C. 
§ 213(a)(1) is a factual question subject to the "clearly errone-
ous" standard of review set forth in Rule 52(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 749 F. 2d, at 1411. But it 
thought that in Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 
649 (1947) and Rutherfood Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U. S. 
722 (1947), this Court appeared to apply a "de novo" standard 
of review to whether an employee falls within an exclusion 
for employees covered by the Motor Carrier Act and to 
whether someone is an independent contractor rather than an 
employee. 749 F. 2d, at 1411. The Court of Appeals recon-
ciled its reading of these cases on grounds that the regula-
tions implementing the provisions at issue in Levinson and 
Rutherford were "illustrative and general," whereas those in 
Walling were "specific," and that the trial court's findings in 
Walling were based on the conflicting testimony of wit-
nesses. 749 F. 2d, at 1412. 
We think that neither Levinson nor Rutherford should be 
read to depart from the rule laid down in Walling. Levinson 
involved a case that was brought to this Court from the 
Supreme Court of Illinois, and that court had accepted the 
factual findings made by the Illinois appellate court. But 
state courts are not required to apply Rule 52(a)—a rule of 
federal civil procedure—to their own appellate system for re-
viewing factual determinations of trial courts. Rutherford 
came up through the federal court system, and this Court 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. v. WORTHINGTON 
held that the District Court erroneously based its conclusion 
that particular employees were independent contractors on 
"isolated factors" in the employee's relationship with the em-
ployer. 331 U. S., at 729-730. We set forth a lengthy sum-
mary of the facts without indicating the source for such a 
summary; but a fair reading of the opinion indicates that we 
were focusing on a legal question, and not on the allocation of 
fact finding responsibilities between district courts and 
courts of appeals. We therefore reaffirm our holding in 
Walling that the facts necessary to a proper determination of 
the legal question whether an exemption to the FLSA applies 
in a particular case should be reviewed by the courts of ap-
peals pursuant to Rule 52(a), like the facts in other civil 
bench-tried litigation in federal courts. 
The Court of Appeals in this case proposed to "apply a de 
novo standard of review to the application of the exemption 
to the facts and [to] review the facts under a clearly errone-
ous standard." 749 F. 2d, at 1412, citing United States v. 
McConney, 728 F. 2d 1195, 1202 (CA9)(en banc), cert, de-
nied, 469 U. S. (1984). But nowhere in its opinion did 
the court ever mention any of the factual findings of the Dis-
trict Court, much less discuss or analyze them. The Court of 
Appeals seems to have believed that the District Court ap-
plied the wrong legal standard for what constitutes a "sea-
man" under § 213(b)(6). Whereas the District Court con-
cluded that respondents were seamen because they 
performed work of a maritime character on navigable waters, 
see App. A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 6, the Court of Appeals held 
that under the pertinent regulations, the critical factor for 
determining whether an employee on a vessel is a seaman is 
whether his "duties primarily aid navigation of the vessel." 
749 F. 2d, at 1412; see also 29 CFR §§783.31, 783.33, 783.36 
(1985). The Court of Appeals reviewed the record independ-
ently and found that the "dominant employment" of the re-
spondents was "industrial maintenance," and that the "mari-
time work" that the respondents performed took but a small 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. r WORTHINGTON 
portion of their work time. 749 F. 2d, at 1412. It therefore 
concluded that respondents were industrial maintenance em-
ployees and not seamen. Ibid. 
We think that the Court of Appeals was mistaken to en-
gage in such factfinding. The District Court found that 
"each of the [respondents] . . . performed wrork which was 
maritime in character and rendered while the Arctic Star was 
in navigable waters." App. A-3 to Pet. for Cert. 6. But it 
made no finding that the "maritime work" was "incidental 
and occasional, taking but a small portion of the work time." 
749 F. 2d, at 1412. The question of how the respondents 
spent their working time on board the Arctic Star is a ques-
tion of fact. The question whether their particular activities 
excluded them from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a 
question of law which both parties concede is governed by the 
pertinent regulations promulgated by the Wage and Hour 
Administrator. See 29 CFR pt. 783 (1985). If the Court of 
Appeals believed that the District Court had failed to make 
findings of fact essential to a proper resolution of the legal 
question, it should have remanded to the District Court to 
make those findings. If it was of the view that the findings 
of the District Court were "clearly erroneous" within the 
meaning of Rule 52(a), it could have set them aside on that 
basis. If it believed that the District Court's factual findings 
were unassailable, but that the proper rule of law was misap-
plied to those findings, it could have reversed the District 
Court's judgment. But it should not simply have made fac-
tual findings on its own. As we stated in Anderson v. Besse-
mer City, 470 U. S. , (1985)(slip op., at 9): 
"The rationale for deference to the original finder of 
fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge's 
position to make determinations of credibility. The trial 
judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with 
experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. 
Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court of ap-
peals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. v. WORTHINGTON 
accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion 
of judicial resources." 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly va-
cated, and the cause remanded to that court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-195 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC., PETITIONER v. 
LARRY WORTHINGTON ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[April 21, 1986] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The Court chastises the Court of Appeals for supplying a 
gap in the District Court's factual findings with uncontested 
facts rather than "remand[ing] to the District Court to make 
those findings." Ante, at 5. The criticism is unwarranted. 
The issue in this case is whether respondents, who are 
maintenance employees on a non-self-propelled seafood pro-
cessing barge, qualify as seamen under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and are therefore entitled to overtime benefits 
under that Act. See 29 U. S. C. § 207(a)(1). The only dis-
pute below was with regard to the proper definition of "sea-
man"—an issue on which certiorari was denied and one on 
which the Court ventures no opinion. The District Court 
"found that the [respondents] performed work of a maritime 
character on navigable waters" and "concluded that the [re-
spondents] were 'seamen' and exempt from the overtime pro-
visions of the FLSA under 29 U. S. C. § 213(b)(6)." 749 F. 
2d 1409, 1411 (CA9 1984). The Court of Appeals reversed 
because "[o]ne does not become a 'seaman' under the FLSA 
merely by performing services aboard a vessel on navigable 
waters." Id., at 1412. Under a proper understanding of 
the statute, it held that respondents were not seamen: 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. v. WORTHINGTON 
"These facts are undisputed . . . 
"The record indicates, and Icicle's counsel conceded at 
oral argument, that the [processing barge] remained an-
chored most of the time. During these periods, the [re-
spondents] primarily monitored, maintained and re-
paired the processing machinery and electric power 
generators. Although some of their work may have 
been of a maritime character, the dominant employment 
was industrial maintenance. The maritime work was in-
cidental and occasional, taking but a small portion of the 
work time. 
"We conclude that these employees, while working on 
a barge anchored in navigable waters, are principally 
employed not as exempt seamen but as industrial main-
tenance employees." Ibid. 
The Court's only quarrel with the Court of Appeals is that 
it "made fact findings on its own" on the issue whether "the 
'maritime work' was 'incidental and occasional, taking but a 
small portion of the work time.'" Ante, at 5. Apparently, 
the Court would have preferred to see the case "remanded to 
the District Court," ibid., for the purely ministerial act of 
entry of formal findings on "these . . . undisputed" facts. 
The "rationale for deference to the original finder of fact," 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. , (1985) (slip 
op. 9), embodied in Rule 52(a) does not compel the entirely 
unrelated proposition that only District Courts may make 
such findings. Appellate courts in general and this Court in 
particular have, after correcting an erroneous interpretation 
of law, applied the proper legal standard to undisputed facts 
of record—whether or not such facts have been memorialized 
in formal findings by "the original finder of fact." This prac-
tice not only promotes "the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination" of civil actions which Rule 52(a) is intended to 
secure, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1, but it allows appellate courts 
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC. u WORTHINGTON 
to give guidance to trial courts by illustrating the proper 
application of a new legal standard in a particular case. 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
